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 PAUL ROBINSON
 ZEMGOR AND THE RUSSIAN ARMY
IN EXILE
The Russian Zemstvo and Towns Relief Committee, Zemgor, which was the
leading Russian aid agency in the inter-war period, imagined itself to be an
apolitical organisation. In its own eyes it stood above parties and party conflict, and
it saw its role exclusively as a provider of humanitarian aid to Russian émigrés,
based on their need not their political stance. Aid, though, is never a purely
humanitarian issue. It involves decisions regarding the allocation of resources,
concerning who gets them and who does not. As such, whatever the aid providers
may think, their activities are inherently political. Furthermore, when people are
starving, impoverished, and homeless, they are dependent on those who supply the
necessities of their lives. The providers of aid can choose to channel aid to those
whom they favour, and withdraw it from those who displease them. They can use it
to enforce obedience to their political platforms, to compel or induce others to
follow them. In short, aid and power go together. 
We should not be surprised, therefore, that the provision of humanitarian aid in
the early years of the Russian emigration was the cause of considerable political
conflict. In particular, Zemgor clashed with the leadership of the Russian Army
from the moment of its arrival in Constantinople in November 1920 onwards, as
both sought to gain control of the aid effort. The exact effects of this clash on the
delivery of aid are hard to determine, though they can hardly have been positive.
Politically, though, the results were extremely damaging for the emigration, further
dividing it and making it ever more difficult for it to present a united face to the
outside world. The history of Zemgor is, therefore, as much a part of the political
history of the emigration as it is of its social and cultural histories. 
Zemgor and Wrangel’s army were two of the most important institutions in the
inter-war Russian emigration. The interaction between them directly affected the
fates of tens of thousands of military émigrés, but has been largely unstudied by
historians. This article provides the first in-depth analysis of the relationship
between these two very different organisations during the early years of the
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emigration, and sheds light on how they and their members adapted to the
circumstances of exile.
The Russian Army and its Attitude to Zemgor
In November 1920 the last significant element of the White armies which had
fought against the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War was driven out of
Russia and into exile. This was the Russian Army led by General Petr Nikolaevich
Wrangel. Between March and November 1920 this army had held out against the
Bolsheviks in the Crimea, but an offensive by the Red Army finally crushed its
resistance, and the survivors crammed onto the ships of the Russian Navy and
sailed out of Russia across the Black Sea to Constantinople. Between 13 and
16 November 1920, around 149,000 people, including 50,000 civilians, boarded
126 ships and set sail from the Crimea into exile.1 Their arrival in Turkey created a
refugee crisis of huge proportions and prompted an international effort to provide
humanitarian aid, which in turn prompted a review and restructuring of the
provision of aid to refugees in general. In terms of the inter-war Russian
emigration, this was the single largest and most important outflux of refugees, and
as such it had great importance for Zemgor and the humanitarian aid effort in
general.
Wrangel’s Russian Army did not cease to exist when it fled Russia. Rather, once
dispersed to refugees camps at Gallipoli, Chatalga, and Lemnos, the army, though
reduced in size, continued to maintain itself. Not until 1927 was the command
structure of the army formally dissolved, and even after that it maintained a
shadowy existence in the form of the Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz (ROVS).2
The officers of the Russian Army believed that their organisation represented the
last remaining institution of the Russian state (Wrangel indeed regarded himself as
the head of state, and had been recognised as such de facto, if not de jure, by the
French government in 1920). They described themselves as “state-minded people”
(gosudarstvenno-mysliashchie liudi), and regarded the preservation of the state,
and thus of the Russian Army, as of the highest importance.3 Furthermore, they
believed that the only way to liberate Russia from the Bolsheviks was by armed
struggle. To do this, the Russian emigration, they felt, had an obligation to maintain
the army in exile so that it could be ready to resume the struggle whenever an
1. Figures for the exact number of refugees are provided in the archives of the Corps
d’occupation de Constantinople, Service historique de l’armée de terre, Château de Vincennes,
Paris (henceforth COC), 20 N 1156, Rapport d’ensemble sur les réfugiés russes, Exode
Wrangel.
2. For the history of the army in exile and of ROVS, see Paul Robinson, The White Russian
Army in Exile (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
3. See for instance, V. Kh. Davatz, Fünf Sturmjahre mit General Wrangel (Berlin: Verlag für
Kulturpolitik, 1927): 12-14.
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opportunity arose. As one of the army’s leading officers, General Aleksandr
Kutepov put it, “budet Armiia, budet i Rossiia”.4
All this meant that in the eyes of the officer corps, the preservation of the army
should be the highest priority for the emigration as a whole, and consequently, such
resources as the emigration had should be concentrated on supporting it. As the last
remnant of Russian statehood (gosudarstvennost′), the army should also control
and direct the use of the whole emigration’s financial assets. According to one of
the members of Wrangel’s government, N. V. Savich, Wrangel wanted the money
to be used exclusively for the army.5 
On his arrival in Constantinople, Wrangel acted quickly to try to maintain his
authority. In particular, he wished to gain control of the substantial financial
resources belonging to the former Russian state which were still intact overseas.
The Ambassadors of Russia in practice possessed most of these assets, so
Wrangel’s task was to persuade them to permit him to dispose of them, and also to
persuade foreign governments of his right to take possession of the property of the
Russian state in their countries. The most important country in this regard was
France, and therefore in November 1920 he sent his Prime Minister Aleksandr
Krivoshein, his Foreign Minister Petr Struve, and his Finance Minister Mikhail
Bernatskii, to Paris to plead the army’s case with the French government and to try
to gain control of the available financial resources.6
Wrangel’s representatives were unable to carry out the task assigned to them, due
to opposition both from the Ambassadors and the French government. The former had
been appointed by the Provisional Government, not by Wrangel, and had no special
loyalty to him. As far as they were concerned, Wrangel no longer held state authority,
and was not entitled to dispose of state assets. They were also disinclined to help him
because they felt he had deceived them about the true situation in the Crimea, assuring
them that all was well even when final defeat was imminent.7 When the leading
Russian ambassadors, Mikhail Girs, Vassilii Maklakov, and Boris Bakhmeteff, met in
Paris on 2 February 1921, they decided that as Wrangel’s government no longer
existed, their conference remained the only legal state authority. As such it would take
on itself the responsibility for the distribution of all state property. The conference also
stated that maintaining the army would be too expensive. Wrangel was mistaken to
believe that the army could survive and the armed struggle be renewed. Finally, the
Ambassadors determined that the distribution of aid to refugees should be
concentrated in the hands of a single organisation, and that that organisation should be
Zemgor.8 This was a decision of vital importance.
4. V. Kh. Davatz & N. N. L′vov, Russkaia Armiia na chuzhbine (Belgrade: Russkoe
Izdatel′stvo, 1923): 84.
5. N. V. Savich, “Konstantinopol′skii Period,” Grani, 152 (April-June 1989): 223.
6. Obshchee delo, 138 (30 November 1920): 1.
7. N. Tongour, Diplomacy in Exile: Russian Émigrés in Paris, 1918-1925 (PhD thesis, Stanford
University, 1979): 313.
8. Zemgor Archive, Box “Diplomaty — Sovet Poslov,” Protokol soveshchaniia poslov, Paris,
8 February 1921.
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The Ambassadors’ decision was in part a result of pressure put on them by the
French government, which had by now decided to abandon Wrangel. In the time it
had taken the general’s representatives to travel from Constantinople to Paris, his
political enemies had been able to lobby the French to persuade them to drop their
support for Wrangel. These efforts were successful. On 29 January 1921, the
French Prime Minister Aristide Briand wrote to the head of Zemgor, Prince
G. E. L´vov, that he could not accept the claims of Wrangel’s representatives to
administer the assets of the former Russian state. Humanitarian aid for refugees,
wrote Briand, should be concentrated in the hands of Zemgor.9 This decision tied
the hands of the Ambassadors. As Mikhail Bernatskii told Wrangel, Briand simply
would not permit him to gain control of Russian state property, and in the
circumstances it was best to let the Ambassadors take the lead in dispersing it.10
Ambassador Girs similarly told Wrangel that handing over control of aid to Zemgor
was the only solution which would permit the funds available to stay in Russian
hands. Otherwise, he wrote, the French would insist on taking control themselves,
so leaving the Russians dependent on their goodwill.11
Whatever the true reasons for it, the Ambassadors’ decision dealt a fatal blow to
Wrangel’s hopes of establishing himself as the leader of the Russian emigration and
of maintaining his army in exile. This led to a bitter reaction in army circles. At the
best of times, the officer corps was prone to a rather paranoid worldview. Its members
also had a very prickly sense of honour. Many thus interpreted the downgrading of
their leading role in émigré society as a personal attack, and in consequence came to
see the beneficiary of the Ambassadors’ decision — Zemgor — as a hostile
organisation. The fact that its leaders were men of liberal political persuasion, led by
the former head of the much-loathed Provision Government, Prince L´vov, was a
major factor in persuading the officer corps of the army of this fact. Thus one of the
army’s propagandists, V. Kh. Davatz, complained that the leadership of Zemgor was
an “oligarchy” of SRs and Cadets which under statute 5 of its constitution could not
be changed, a fact which he considered a mockery of democratic principles. Zemgor,
he complained, did all it could to make the life of the Army more difficult.12 Zemgor
was led by people hostile to the army, claimed Davatz in a book co-authored with the
Cadet politician N. N. L´vov. It had leftist tendencies, and was not apolitical, as it
claimed.13 This image of Zemgor tarnished the army’s attitudes to it henceforth.
For much of 1921, Wrangel hoped to find some way out of his predicament and
to persuade émigré humanitarian organisations to accept his leadership. The
prevailing attitude was expressed by Wrangel’s official representative in
9. Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), P. N. Wrangel Archive (WA), Box 139, File 9, Letter,
Briand to L′vov, 29 January 1921.
10. Bakhmeteff Archive (BA), Columbia University, M. Bernatskii Collection, Folder
“Settlement of White Army Veterans,” Letter, Bernatskii to Wrangel, 6 February 1921.
11. HIA, WA, Box 148, File 36, Letter, Girs to Wrangel, n˚ 100, 10 February 1921.
12. Davatz, Fünf Sturmjahre mit General Wrangel: 19-20.
13. Davatz & L′vov, Russkaia Armiia na chuzhbine: 48.
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Yugoslavia, S. N. Paleolog, who opposed giving what would nowadays be termed
Non-Governmental Organisations a leading role in aid delivery. According to
Paleolog, the emigration’s priority should be the preservation of “state” authority
(in other words the preservation of the army and of Wrangel’s leadership), a
priority which could not survive if authority shifted to social organisations
(obshchestvennye organisatsii).14 The army, its supporters believed, should direct
the work of the social organisations, not be dependent on them.
To this end, in June 1921, a medical conference of representatives of the Army
and social organisations was formed in Constantinople. This coordinated their
efforts and had some positive effects. In August 1921 the military medical
institutions were put under the control of the Russian Red Cross. But a meeting of
Wrangel and the Central United Committee (Tsentral´nyi ob´´edinennyi Komitet —
TsOK) of the main émigré charities — the Russian Red Cross, the Vserossiiskii
Zemskii Soiuz (VZS) and the Vserossiiskii Soiuz Gorodov (VSG) in August 1921
ended without agreement on how to coordinate their work.15
At this meeting, Wrangel attempted to put the activities of the social
organisations under his control, and to use their means and authority to preserve the
army. Wrangel proposed uniting all Russian social organisations into one
institution, which would act under his direction. The leaders of the social
organisations rejected this idea, even though they supported the preservation of the
army. Wrangel then tried to pass responsibility for the care and provision of the
troops onto them, but the members of the TsOK showed no enthusiasm for taking
up the burden.16 In addition to this, the VZS defied Wrangel by refusing to let his
officials audit its accounts, even though in those parts of Russia which had been
controlled by the Whites, the organisation had always allowed the army to do so.
The VZS now claimed, though, that Wrangel no longer possessed state authority,
and instead passed it accounts to the Ambassadors for auditing.17
Despite this, the army’s relations with the VZS remained good. This was not the
case with its relations with Zemgor, which in part subsidised the VZS and other
charities. Indeed, the army leadership, in a sense of righteous indignation, had come
to convince itself that Zemgor was deliberately deceiving it. A particular bone of
contention was the fate of one million francs which the army said had been handed
over to Ambassador Girs by the Russian military representative in Japan, General
Podtiagin. Girs in turn passed the money onto Prince L´vov on the understanding
14. HIA, S. N. Paleolog Collection, Box 2, File 8 ; Box 3, File 4, Part 1, also contains various
resolutions and drafts of plans for the unification of aid delivery by the Army, Red Cross,
Zemgor and other organisations.
15. S. S. Ippolitov, S. V. Karpenko, E. I. Pivovar, “Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Konstantinopole
v nachale 1920-kh godov (chislennost′, material′noe polozhenie, repatriatsiia),”
Otechestvennaia istoriia, 5 (September/October 1993): 81.
16. E. I. Pivovar, Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Turtsii, iugo-vostochnoi i tsentral′noi Evrope 20-kh
godov (Gottingen: Konrad Pachnicke, 1994): 28.
17. Ocherk deiatel′nosti Vserossiiskogo Zemskogo Soiuza za granitsei, aprel′ 1920 g. — 1
ianvar´ia 1922 g. (Sofia, 1922): 19-20; and Zarnitsy, 19 (21 August 1921): 29.
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that it would be used to improve the living conditions of the men of the Russian
Army. What happened to the money thereafter is not clear. The army High
Command complained that it was not used for the specified purpose, an accusation
which Zemgor denied.18 The army leadership, however, was disinclined to believe
Zemgor. To it, the episode confirmed suspicions that Zemgor was using its control
of émigré finances to undermine the army. For this reason, Wrangel did all that was
in his power to try to prevent Zemgor gaining further influence over émigré affairs.
Thus, when the League of Nations met in June 1921 to discuss the creation of a
central organisation charged with dealing with the Russian refugee problem, the
former Minister of War in the Provisional Government, A. I. Guchkov, went to
Geneva to argue the army’s case and fend off efforts by Prince L′vov and Miliukov
to promote Zemgor’s claim to leadership.19 
Wrangel hoped that if the army could not take the leading role he desired, the
Russian Red Cross could do so.20 In the end, though, the League of Nations created
an entirely new organisation under the command of a High Commissioner for
Refugees, Fridtjof Nansen. From the point of the view of the army, this was not a
welcome outcome, since Nansen firmly believed that the best solution to the
refugee problem was to repatriate Russians to Russia, a policy firmly opposed by
the army leadership. The appointment of Nansen, coming on top of the
Ambassadors’ endorsement of Zemgor, reflected the extent to which the Russian
Army had lost the battle for control of the business of aid.
Zemgor and the Provision of Aid to the Army in Turkey
The conflict between Zemgor and the Army was an inevitable product of their
differing purposes and differing attitudes. The leaders of Zemgor did not share the
army leadership’s view of its own importance. Politically, many of them were not
supporters of the army, which was seen as somewhat reactionary. They regarded
the idea that the armed struggle could resume as foolish and even dangerous. This
was a common view among those on the liberal left, who regarded the army not as a
solution to the Russians’ forced exile, but as a major part of the problem. The
Russian people, some felt, would never overthrow the Bolsheviks as long as the
White generals were likely to replace them. The émigrés’ days of exile could only
come to an end if the power of the generals was crushed, and their army destroyed. 
How far the leaders of Zemgor shared such thinking, it is hard to tell, since in
public they maintained the stance that their organisation was apolitical and purely
humanitarian in purpose. As such, Zemgor should, they argued, direct resources to
those who needed them most, rather than direct them to the army, where they would
18. HIA, WA, Box 148, File 36, Letter, Chertkov to Khripunov, n˚ p./127, 26 April 1921. BA,
ROVS Collection, Box 166, Letters, Balabanov to Guchkov, and Zeeler to Miller.
19. HIA, WA, Box 148, File 36, Letter, Guchkov to Wrangel, 30 June 1921.
20. HIA, WA, Box 148, File 36, Letter, Wrangel to S. N. Il′in, n˚ 157/s, 12 July 1921.
ZEMGOR AND THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN EXILE 725
be used to keep officers employed doing very little. As able-bodied men, those
officers ought to be able to care for themselves. Women, children, the disabled, and
others unable to maintain themselves, should be a higher priority for the
emigration’s very limited funds. This very different view of what should be done
paved the way to inevitable conflict. Even if Zemgor was acting for purely
humanitarian purposes, its approach did constitute an attack on the army. It
undermined the army’s efforts to concentrate resources on its own preservation.
Regardless of intention, the determination of priorities for the provision of aid was,
therefore, a political as much as a humanitarian decision.
The attitude of the army to Zemgor was clear: it disliked and distrusted it. The
attitude of Zemgor to the army is somewhat harder to determine. This is especially
true since there is almost no correspondence between the leaders of the army and
Zemgor preserved in the archives of either organisation. This reflects the fact that at
the highest level their leaders were scarcely on speaking terms. On the other hand,
at a lower level, relations between the army and the charitable organisations
through which Zemgor operated were invariably good. Where organisations funded
by Zemgor worked with members of the army, they got on well together. The
conflicts were, therefore, purely at the higher levels. According to a representative
of the Vserossiiskii Soiuz Gorodov in Belgrade in 1922, at a meeting with Wrangel,
the latter noted “the fruitful work of the institutions of the Union of Towns in the
localities, but drew attention to the politics, hostile to the army’s interests, of the
highest leaders of Zemsko-Gorodskii work abroad”.21
Undoubtedly, Zemgor’s leaders were not willing to accept any claims to
leadership put forward by Wrangel. They also felt that Wrangel’s efforts to
preserve the army complicated the lives of his soldiers, making it harder for them to
face the reality of their situation and have to adapt to a new way of life. As a report
from Bulgaria noted in 1922, “dreams of preserving the former cadres [of the army]
cannot be realised. The sooner the commanding staff realises this, the more
painlessly and peacefully this transitional period will pass”.22
Dislike of the army’s leadership and its strategy did not, however, translate into
a lack of concern for the ordinary soldier. Indeed, Zemgor was not at all
unsympathetic to the plight of the army’s soldiers, and through other organisations
provided substantial aid to the army after its arrival at Constantinople. 
When the Russian Army arrived in Constantinople, it was in a terrible shape. Its
soldiers, along with the accompanying civilians (who included women and
children) had spent several days in overcrowded vessels, with little food or water.
Few had money. There was little prospect of employment in Turkey. There was a
shortage of accommodation, clothing, food, and medicine. The French army, then
occupying Constantinople, took the lead in providing support for the refugees.
French aid included a small daily food ration, tents, and other basic supplies. These
21. Zemgor Archive, Leeds, Arkhiv n˚ 138, Iugoslaviia 1922-1923, Informatsiia
Predstavitel′stva Vserossiiskogo Soiuza Gorodov v korolevstve S.Kh.S., n˚ 9, 21 March 1922.
22. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚143, Bolgariia 1921-1930, Report n˚ 25, 23 September 1922.
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were sufficient to maintain life, but scarcely more. Charitable organisations
therefore stepped in to supplement the French supplies and improve the conditions
of life.
The most important such organisation was possibly the American Red Cross,
which provided tents and medical aid, as well as additional rations for those most in
need.23 Three Russian charities also played an important role. These were the Russian
Red Cross, the Vserossiiskii Zemskii Soiuz, and the Vserossiiskii Soiuz Gorodov.
Despite the similarity of their titles, the latter two were in fact entirely distinct from
Zemgor. Indeed, as the director of the VZS, A. S. Khripunov, pointed out to
Wrangel’s mother, Mariia, in 1927, not only was the VZS independent of Zemgor,
but politically its stance was entirely different too.24 Nevertheless, it was through the
VZS and VSG that Zemgor operated in providing aid to the Russian Army. 
Because so many organisations were involved in the provision of aid, it did not
take people long to come to the conclusion that it would be more efficient if the
various groups involved in the aid business coordinated their work under some
form of central control. As a first step in the direction, the VSG, VZS and Russian
Red Cross formed the previously mentioned Central United Committee (TsOK) to
coordinate their activities. Zemgor, however, soon came to overshadow the TsOK.
On the ground in Turkey Zemgor had little if any direct contact with the army.
Zemgor got some 60% of its income from the Committee of Ambassadors and 40%
from its own resources. It then passed on its money to organisations like VSG and
VZS, who did the practical work of providing aid.25 The army’s actual experience
of charitable organisations was, therefore, with these groups not with Zemgor itself.
The experience appears to have been a positive one, appreciated by both sides.26
At Gallipoli, for instance, where part of the army was interned, the VZS opened a
shop selling necessities at a low price, thus enabling the often starving refugees to
supplement their meagre rations. It also helped to set up various workshops, which
provided many of the material needs of the troops. These included a shoe workshop
at Gallipoli which repaired some 5,000 pairs of shoes and boots, and made about
1,600 new ones before closing in August 1921. Another workshop made around
1,000 pieces of furniture and other items to furnish the bare accommodation in
which the Russians lived.27 The Russian social organisations also spent money
23. The activities of the American Red Cross are described in J. A. Hutchins, “The Wrangel
Refugees: A Study of General Baron Peter N. Wrangel’s Defeated White Russian Forces, both
Military and Civilian, in Exile” (MA thesis, Louisville, KY, University of Louisville, 1972):
46-64. This thesis is based on the archives of the ARC.
24.  HIA, M. D. Wrangel Archive, Box 26, File 5, Letter, Khripunov to M. D. Wrangel,
16 November 1927.
25. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 138, Letter, V. Rudnev to Viktor Diodorovich [Brianskii],
n˚ 7602, 5 June 1923.
26. For details of the aid provided by these organisations to the Russians at Gallipoli, see
“Deiatel′nost´ obshchestvennykh organisatsii,” in Russkie v Gallipoli: sbornik statei (Berlin,
1923): 343-354; and Ocherk deiatel′nosti Vserossiiskogo Zemskogo Soiuza za granitsei,
op. cit.
27. Russkie v Gallipoli: sbornik statei (Berlin, 1923): 346.
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providing musical instruments, linen, clothing, soap, paper, cooking materials,
hairdressing equipment, tobacco, and medicine, and gave funds for building
churches, officers’ messes, and bathrooms in the various camps of the army. They
provided meals for children (several hundred of whom had accompanied the army
into exile) and the sick, and for those recuperating from illness.28 By October 1921,
they had provided 184,000 such meals at Gallipoli alone.29 The VSG also
subsidised educational courses for soldiers in the camps, as well as libraries, sports
leagues, choirs, theatres, and the printing of newspapers.30 In all these ways,
Russian social organisations, whose activities were in part indirectly funded by
Zemgor, played an important role in alleviating the undoubtedly harsh conditions
of life of those army members who remained in the camps in Turkey in 1921.
At first, some in army confused VSG and VZS with Zemgor, which led to a
certain suspicion of their activities. But after the arrival in April 1921 of new
representatives of those organisations who “caught the pulse of the army”, this
ceased. On visiting Gallipoli, the head of the VZS, A. S. Khripunov, commented
that “he had never anywhere observed such a merging of obshchestvennost′ and the
army as at Gallipoli”.31 The official history of the Russian Army at Gallipoli
concluded that, “There was not a single corner of the Russian Army at Gallipoli
which did not feel the help of the union [the VZS]”.32
As well as working through organisations like the VZS, Zemgor also
occasionally acted behind the scenes to protect the interests of members of the
Russian Army. This became clear in March 1921 when the French authorities
announced that they would no longer provide rations to the Russian Army, whose
members were to be given three options: return to Russia; go to Brazil, where the
state of Sao Paolo had offered work to some 10,000 Russians; or find work where
they were.33 The last was an impractical option given the lack of work for
foreigners in Constantinople, and Brazil was immensely unpopular since the
Russians had only been offered employment as low paid plantation labourers. In
practice, the choice was one of repatriation (which would have meant possible
death for many because of their anti-Soviet pasts) or starvation.
At this point, Zemgor rallied to the army’s defence. The Zemgor Committee in
Paris wrote to Briand requesting that the provision of rations to the army be
continued, and subsequently also requested that the rations be increased.34 In the
end the French backed down and continued feeding the Russian Army, largely






33. COC, C 20 N 1154, Telegram, Briand to Charpy, 11 March 1921.
34. Zemgor Archive, Box “Diplomaty — Sovet Poslov”, Letter to Briand, 25 March 1921. Also,
Vserossiiskii Zemskii Soiuz, Biulleten′ Vremennogo Glavnogo Komiteta, 2 (July 1921): 95-96.
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feed the troops if they were to avoid army members taking drastic, even violent
action to ensure their survival. Zemgor’s intervention was probably not crucial in
this regard, but it did at least reveal that the organisation was not perhaps as hostile
to the army as some of its members imagined.
Zemgor also spoke out against the repatriation of Russians.35 This also put it on
the same side as the army leadership, which resisted efforts by the French and later
Nansen to repatriate thousand of Cossack soldiers from the army. However,
Zemgor’s approach to the matter was somewhat different from that of the army
leadership, and this caused further conflict between the two. Thus, when protesting
against French plans to repatriate members of the army or send them to Brazil,
Zemgor noted that the former option would put the lives of many at risk, while the
latter would condemn them to exploitation and possibly a “hungry death”. But,
Zemgor also stated its belief that the army should be dispersed.36 Wrangel was by
this stage willing to see the army move out of Turkey, but still hoped to do so in a
manner which kept it together. As such, he and Zemgor were still working in
opposite directions.
Disputes over repatriation continued into 1923, when Nansen signed an
agreement with the Soviet government in which the latter agreed to permit refugees
to return and gave them guarantees for their safety if they did so. Nansen’s
willingness to trust these promises reflected the growing international acceptance
of communist rule in Russia. One of Nansen’s colleagues, T. F. Johnson, noted that
Nansen believed that the return of refugees to Russia constituted “by far the best
solution” to the refugee problem, and the agreement reflected his stance.37
Nansen’s behaviour caused outrage in army circles, which did not want to weaken
the forces of the anti-Soviet opposition in exile by having refugees return home. In
May 1923, Wrangel’s political advisor S.N. Il´in issued a circular complaining that
the members of Zemgor had introduced a resolution supporting Nansen’s efforts to
negotiate a repatriation deal with the Soviets. Zemgor had no right to speak on
behalf of Russian refugees, claimed Il´in. Indeed, Zemgor was an organisation alien
to their interests, whereas those organisations who did speak for the mass of
émigrés took an entirely different view of repatriation and the activities of Nansen.
Those thinking of trusting Nansen’s promises should be warned, Il´in concluded.38 
Two members of the Zemgor Committee, N. Astrov and S. Panin denied Il´in’s
claims. They stated that the resolution in question had not been passed, largely
because it was no longer necessary, Nansen having already signed an agreement
with the Soviets. Zemgor did not believe that repatriation could solve the refugee
35. See for instance, Memorandum to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the
Council of the League of Nations from Representatives of the Russian Red Cross and the
Zemsko-Gorodskii Committee in Geneva, 15 June 1921.
36. Zemgor Archive, Box “Diplomaty — Sovet Poslov”, Letter to Briand, 25 March 1921, and
untitled, undated Report, probably March 1921.
37. T. F. Johnson, International Tramps: From Chaos to World Peace (London: Hutchinson,
1938): 279.
38. HIA, WA, Box 149, File 39: 535-538, Circular, S. N. Il´in, n˚ k/2075-2084, 16 May 1923.
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problem, they said, but Zemgor did recognise that some refugees wished to return
to the Soviet Union and were in some cases already doing so. In the circumstances,
they concluded, it was better that they return with some care provided to them by
the High Commissioner than without it.39 The army leadership, perhaps fearing the
loss of its men, objected that Soviet promises could not be trusted. Again, one can
see here how the issue of repatriation touched on the future of the army and so was
political in nature as much as humanitarian.
Concluding this section, one can see that in practice Zemgor did help to alleviate
the harsh conditions experienced by Russian soldiers after their withdrawal from
the Crimea. Zemgor did not, though, get the credit due to it for this because it
worked indirectly through third parties, primarily the VZS and VSG, and also
because it focused its support on aid to individuals, while opposing the maintenance
of the army qua army. Zemgor made not have realised it, but this opposition was an
act of politics, and was interpreted as such. It caused a bitter reaction which
complicated the provision of aid more than was strictly necessary.
The Provision of Aid in the Balkans and Czechoslovakia
In a rare example of cooperation (albeit indirect), Zemgor, the Ambassadors, and
the Army High Command managed in late 1921 to find new homes for the troops of
the Army in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, both of whose governments viewed the
White cause favourably. Wrangel’s chief of staff General P. N. Shatilov reached an
agreement with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments in 1921, as a result of
which the bulk of the army moved to those countries as an organised mass in the last
few months of that year.40 This represented a victory of sorts for the army
command, as the units of the army remained to some extent intact. This merely put
off the day of the army’s final disintegration, but it did allow it to maintain some
sort of military structure and to evolve gradually into a new body, ROVS. Leaders
of the army and their supporters claimed that by keeping the army together they
were able to provide much better humanitarian assistance to their soldiers than
would have been possible if the plans of the French and Zemgor to disperse the
army rapidly had been carried out.
As a postscript to this part of the story, however, it should be noted that Zemgor
did help to some small degree in the transfer of Wrangel’s troops to Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria. Under the terms of the treaties Shatilov negotiated with the Yugoslavs,
the Russians had to provide the Yugoslav government with a sum of $400,000. As
Wrangel did not have such money himself, he had to ask the Ambassadors for it,
and Ambassador Bakhmeteff agreed to supply the money. Bakhmeteff then sent
39. HIA, WA, Box 149, File 39: 539-540, Letter, N. Astrov and S. Panin to Iu. I. Lodyzhenskii,
n˚ 833, 4 May 1923.
40. For details of these negotiations and agreements see Robinson, The White Russian
Army…: 45-46.
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Prince L´vov and V. F. Zeeler from Zemgor to Yugoslavia to complete the
arrangements, and reduce the amount demanded from 400 dinars per person per
month for two years to only 300 dinars per person per month for only 10 months.41
This was a very rare case of everybody pulling together in the same direction, and it
brought positive results, enabling the transfer of elements of the Russian Army to
Yugoslavia to take place smoothly and without undue complications.
Once the army had taken up residence in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, it survived
off a number of sources of revenue. One of these was the money provided by the
Ambassadors. Another was the wages soldiers themselves earned by leaving the
formal structure of the army to find work, or in the case of Yugoslavia through
organised work projects in which whole units of the army were kept together in the
border guards, and road and rail building. In addition, the army raised some
37 million dinars from the sale of the assets of the Petrograd Credit Institution.42
These were deposits for loans placed in the Institute prior to the Revolution, which
had fallen into the army’s hands after the Institute moved them to the south of
Russia for safe keeping during the Civil War. The army used the funds to provide
personal loans, training and education, medical care, and sanitation.43
Even with these resources, the conditions of life for many, if not most, members
of the army remained very difficult. For this reason, aid provided by the VSG, VZS,
and Red Cross continued to play an important role in improving the quality of their
lives. A large portion of the funds for such aid continued to come from Zemgor.
Politically, the VZS and VSG remained close to Wrangel. When he attempted to
re-establish political leadership over the Russian emigration by creating in 1921 a
Russian Council, led by him but with representatives from Russian social
organisations, they agreed to participate in it. In this way, they highlighted again the
political nature of aid organisations. In summer 1922, however, the VSG left the
Council after elections to it produced a majority of monarchist delegates.44 This
decision, paralleled by the defection of some other groups, spelt the death of the
Council, which Wrangel disbanded soon afterwards. Further efforts to unite the
emigration politically continued for years, but from this point on the army
abandoned the attempt to take the lead itself. 
Interestingly, despite cutting the ground from under Wrangel’s Russian Council,
the VSG’s political position was very similar to that of the Russian general and his
staff. For in complaining that monarchist groups had taken over the Council, it was
echoing a complaint made by Wrangel himself, as the general was at this time
embroiled in a bitter conflict with monarchist groups.45 Thus, while the army’s
41. Vserossiiskii Zemskii Soiuz, Biulleten´ Vremennogo Glavnogo Komiteta, 2 (July 1921):
95-96.
42. Davatz, Fünf Sturmjahre mit General Wrangel:112-113.
43. Ibid.: 113.
44. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 138, Iugoslaviia 1922-1923, Informatsiia Predstavitel ′stva
Vserossiiskogo Soiuza Gorodov v Korolevstva S.Kh.S, n˚ 24, 26 July 1922.
45. Robinson, The White Russian Army…: 62-63.
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relations with Zemgor remained poor, its relations with the organisations through
which Zemgor channelled its money to provide aid on the ground in the Balkans
remained good.
In Bulgaria the VZS, through its representative V. S. Resnichenko, worked very
closely with the army, to which it continued to provide aid, particularly once its
members began to disperse in search of employment or further education. One of
the main concentrations of Russian soldiers was at the Pernik mines in Bulgaria,
where several thousand worked. In October 1922, VZS reported that it was
organising a tea-room and library at Pernik.46 Some years later, Zemgor itself was
in contact with Russian officers there. In 1925, the Circle of Russian National
Youth at Pernik wrote to Zemgor asking for books and magazines to support its
work in “preserving among its members a love of the Motherland, the national
religion, national history, literature, and the great Russian language”. The Circle
claimed 140 members in Pernik and 60 elsewhere. In January 1926, Zemgor
despatched 20 books to Pernik in response.47
This exchange was of some wider interest in that the Circle of Russian National
Youth was the organisation which later evolved into the Natsional´nyi Trudovoi
Soiuz (NTS), one of the more active political bodies in the Russian emigration in
the 1940s, especially in the years of the Second World War. It appears, therefore,
that though Zemgor was unwilling to support the army, it was not opposed to
supporting nationalist organisations per se. In a similar way, the VSG helped to
organise scout and sokol organisations in Yugoslavia in the early 1920s,48 thus
helping to bring up émigré youth in a nationalist spirit.
More generally, in the early 1920s the VSG and VZS provided aid to army
members in a wide variety of ways. Accounts from early 1922, for instance, record
expenditures on workshops, educational courses, hostels, subsidised restaurants,
foreign language courses, and so on.49 Not all of this expenditure was directed
towards army members, but as they constituted much of the emigration in the
Balkans, a substantial portion of it must have reached them.
One of the main areas supported by Zemgor through VZS and VSG was
education. Many members of the Russian Army had failed even to complete their
High School education when in Russia, having left school to join the army either in
World War One or during the Civil War. Lacking any sort of High School Diploma,
they now found it difficult to find any form of white collar employment, while it
46. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 143, Bolgariia 1921-1930, Report n˚ 28, 14 October 1922.
47. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 143, Bolgariia 1921-1930, Letter from the Informatsionnyi
otdel po Kruzhke Russkoi Natsional′noi Molodezhi, n˚ 11, Pernik, 24 September 1925. Also,
Letter, n˚ 21 to V. Rudnev, 23 November 1925; and Letter, V. Rudnev to the Circle of Russian
National Youth, 13 January 1926.
48. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 138, Iugoslaviia 1922-1923, Informatsiia Predstavitel′stva
Vserossiiskogo Soiuza Gorodov v Korolevstve S.Kh.S., n˚ 14, 25 April 1922.
49. For instance, Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 136, Iugoslaviia 1922-1925, Smeta raskhodov
Vserossiiskogo Zemskogo Soiuza na okazanie pomoshchi rossiiskim grazhdanam,
nakhodiashchim v Serbii na period fevral ´ 1922 goda.
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was also impossible for them to gain such diplomas since they were now well
beyond normal school age, and Yugoslav and Bulgarian schools were unwilling to
educate them. 
To deal with this problem, the VSG in Yugoslavia set up a course to enable army
members to receive a school leaving certificate. Lacking sufficient resources to
fund this course itself, the VSG appealed to Zemgor for aid, noting “our moral
obligation towards the military youth, who have shed their blood for Russia”.50 In
response, Zemgor agreed to assign some 7,000 dinars a month to the courses, which
began in Panchevo in September 1923.51 In this way, it helped several dozen army
members build better lives for themselves in exile.
Politics, though, intruded even into the world of schooling. The politically-
minded understood that what young exiles learnt could help determine their
subsequent attitudes. For this reason, the army leadership was keen to include a
strong national element in Russian education overseas, as well as some military
training through the Cadet Corps in Yugoslavia, and physical education to build
strong fighters for the future army. This brought the army into conflict with more
liberal elements of the emigration who wanted to focus more on providing an
education which would help young émigrés find useful employment or further
education. Thus, in 1927 a librarian at the Zemgor-controlled Russian school in
Varna, Bulgaria, complained that it was very difficult to introduce organised sports
into the curriculum because Zemgor officials had a great fear of even a hint of
something that reminded them of the military.52
Although receiving a school leaving certificate mattered to some army
members, more were concerned with entering higher education to receive a
university degree. The prime destination in this regard was Czechoslovakia. In
1921, the Czech government agreed to let a first batch of 100 soldiers from
Gallipoli enter the country to study at university. Once the army moved to
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, many others in the army began to leave its ranks and head
to Czechoslovakia to join their former colleagues in their studies. This was
especially true of those in Bulgaria. In 1922 the Bulgarian government of
Alexander Stamboulisky turned on the Russian Army, arrested many of its
commanders, and accused its members of plotting a coup. Fearing further
persecution, many Russians decided to flee westwards.
In Bulgaria, the VZS provided aid to army members to travel to Czechoslovakia
to go to university.53 For the most part, though, would-be students travelled at their
50. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 138, Iugoslaviia 1922-1923, Letter, Special Representative of
VSG to Zemsko-Gorodskoi Komitet, n˚ 558, 5 April 1923; and Arkhiv n˚ 139, Iugoslaviia
1923-1927, Informatsiia Predstavitel′stva V.S.G. v Korolevstve S.Kh.S, n˚ 58, 3 October 1923.
51. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 139, Iugoslaviia 1923-1927, Letter, Rudnev to Brianskii,
n˚ 9313, 12 November 1923.
52. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, f. 5826, op. 1, d. 193, l. 44, Letter,
A. Kurbatov to General Gulevich, 1 September 1927).
53. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 143, Bolgariia 1921-1930, Report n˚ 32, 11 November 1922.
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own expense, and in general entered Czechoslovakia illegally.54 Once there,
lacking any means of support or any legal status, they relied for support primarily
on the Prague Committee of Zemgor. One Gallipoli veteran, Colonel
V. V. Almendinger, who eventually received a PhD in agricultural sciences,
described how, after entering Czechoslovakia illegally, he arrived in Prague with
just 50 crowns in his pocket. To regularise his position, he visited the offices of
Zemgor bearing a letter of recommendation. Zemgor then gave him some money
and a letter to the relevant Czech ministry to legalise his status in the country. After
this, he received the papers which allowed him to stay, and began studies at the
Agricultural Institute of Brno.55
Almendinger’s experience was a common one. In the early 1920s, Prague
Zemgor helped to bring 438 students from the Russian Army to Czechoslovakia
through legal channels. It also worked to legalise the situation of several thousand
others who had entered the country illegally. It did this by registering them with the
Russian Department of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which trusted
Zemgor to act as its agent in these matters.56 Zemgor registered 1,753 people in this
way in 1921; 1,974 in 1922; 1,317 in 1923; and 527 in 1924.57
Despite the aid which Prague Zemgor provided to army members in this way,
the army continued to regard it as a hostile organisation. Again, this was a case of
the military and social organisations working together happily at the lower end
while assuming positions of outright hostility at the higher levels. 
For example, Wrangel’s representative in Czechoslovakia, General Leontev,
noted that in June 1921 Prague Zemgor opened a registration department to give out
residence permits in Czechoslavakia. This, he said, had caused great worry that the
documents previously given out by diplomatic and consular representatives would
no longer be valid: “Diplomatic institutions, consulates and military agencies, like
other representatives of old Russia are now a thorn in the flesh of left-wing parties”,
Leontev wrote, “and all their efforts are now directed towards weakening their
influence and significance and to discrediting them. It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to do this under the flag of the socialist-revolutionaries ... and so they
have constructed a very cunning plan, to exploit the majority held by members of
the Prague socialist-revolutionary staff within Zemstvo and Town institutions to
form a Prague branch of Zemgor, and under its flag continue their former work”.58 
The image of Prague Zemgor as an undercover branch of the Socialist-
Revolutionary Party had at least some basis in reality. Of 63 members of the Prague
54. For a description of how this was done, see V. V. Almendinger, Gallipoliiskoe
zemliachestvo v Brno: pamiatnaia zapiska o zhizni gallipoliitsev v Brno (Huntington Park,
California, 1968): 11-14. Copy held at the Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.
55. Almendinger, Gallipoliiskoe zemliachestvo…: 14-17.
56. Ocherk deiatel′nosti Ob′′edineniia Rossiiskikh Zemskikh i Gorodskikh Deiatelei v
Chekhoslovatskoi Respublike “Zemgor” (Prague, 1925): 26-27.
57. Ibid.: 30.
58. HIA, E. K. Miller Archive, Box 15, File 25, Letter, Leontev to Miller, n˚ 90, 15 June 1921.
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Zemgor Committee in 1925, there were no fewer than 29 SRs. Of the remainder,
only 10 were members of no political party, there were two Cadets (who could be
described as centrists in political terms), and the remainder were all members of
other left-wing groups: there were three Narodnye-Sotsialisty, one Social-
Democrat, three members of Krestianskaia Rossiia, and 15 members of the Soiuz
Vozrozhdeniia Kazachestva.59 
This membership gave the organisation a decidedly left-wing political
complexion. Given that a large proportion of the Russians in Czechoslovakia were
former soldiers, either Cossacks or officers of the Russian Army, Zemgor’s
leadership certainly had a different orientation from those it was supposedly
representing, and to whom it was giving aid. It is noticeable that the only member of
Prague Zemgor who described himself as an officer of the army general staff was
Col F. E. Makhin, and he was a Socialist-Revolutionary.
The fact that the Cossacks within Prague Zemgor were from the Soiuz
Vozrozhdeniia Kazachestva is also revealing. This organisation was created in
December 1920 by radical political activists among the Don, Kuban, and Terek
Cossacks. It blamed the White generals for the Cossacks’ defeat in the Civil War,
and while calling for continued struggle against the Bolsheviks, demanded
statehood for the Cossack peripheries of Russia, and insisted that the Cossacks
reject the leadership of the army High Command.60 
There were strong suspicions that groups such as this exploited their dominant
position within Zemgor for party political purposes. Thus in June 1924, Wrangel’s
representative in Poland, General P. S. Makhrov, noted that 200 Russians soldiers,
including a group of Ural Cossacks, who had previously been interned in Poland,
had left to work and study in Czechoslovakia. There, Makhrov claimed, they found
that despite Zemgor’s claims to the contrary it had a definite political character.
Zemgor formed a Cossack group to organise a social congress to unite Cossacks in
Czechoslovakia, which the Ural Cossacks attended. However, this congress turned
out to have a political agenda, and at it General Sidorin made a speech hostile to the
Commander-in-Chief. The Uraltsy left the Congress in protest. This, Makhrov
stated, put them in a delicate situation, as they need to enter some sort of
organisation to legalise their position in the counry.61
Prague Zemgor responded to such claims in a robust fashion. According to a
bulletin issued by it: 
From the moment of the Union’s creation certain circles of the Russian emigra-
tion in Prague have struggled in earnest against Zemgor, with the aim of taking
responsibility for the care of Russian refugees out of the hands of Zemgor.
Efforts have been made to discredit its activity, both in front of the government
of the Czechoslovak Republic and in front of the refugee masses and refugee aid
59. Ocherk deiatel´nosti Ob′′edineniia Rossiiskikh Zemskikh i Gorodskikh Deatelei…: 12-13.
60. Grigorii Rakovskii, Konets Belykh (Prague: Izdatel′stvo “Volia Rossii”, 1921): 229-233.
61. HIA, P. A. Kussonskii Collection, Box 10, File 40, Letter, Makhrov to Miller, n˚ 181,
16 June 1924.
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organisations. Zemgor has been accused of partiinost´ in the one-sided, tenden-
tious character of its activity, rumours have been spread about abuses committed
by its leaders, and they have been reproached for complete incompetence. At the
same time, efforts have been made to demonstrate that the mass of Russian refu-
gees does not sympathise with Zemgor by means of resolutions brought forward
by several Russian organisations in Prague.62
Both the left and the right had engaged in these attacks, claimed Zemgor.
“Monarchist circles particularly hate Zemgor because it is an apolitical
organisation, which has decisively rejected any efforts to create overseas an armed
force for struggle against the Bolsheviks” (a revealing statement, for that rejection
was a political act, and so contradicted Zemgor’s claim to be apolitical).63 Zemgor
listed the organisations opposing it, which it said had “an insignificant number of
members, and no influence over broad émigré circles”. Examples were: the
National Committee (a centrist political organisation, closely aligned with
Wrangel), the Torgovo-Promyshlennyi Committee, the Society of Officers, the
Damskii Kruzhok, and the Russian Red Cross committee for aid to children.64
Zemgor explained the campaign against it by attributing to its opponents exactly
the same motives that they were assigning to it: “the desire of certain political
circles to seize the business of aid to refugees in their hands, to make refugees
dependent on them, and by means of this dependence enable themselves to use the
émigré mass in pursuit of their political goals.”65
A balanced view would conclude that both sides in these disputes were half-
right and half-wrong. Both Zemgor and the army claimed to be apolitical, while
accusing the other of partiinost′. In practice, they were right to note the political
nature of their opponents, while wrong to deny the political nature of their own
activities. However much Prague Zemgor may have imagined itself an apolitical
body, the profile of its membership made it impossible for others to accept it as
such. 
The perception that Prague Zemgor was a socialist front organisation
undoubtedly put obstacles in its way. This can be seen in the curious episode of the
aforementioned Colonel Makhin, who in March 1924 appeared in Belgrade on a
mysterious mission from Prague Zemgor. His visit baffled the representative of the
VSG in Belgrade, V. D. Brianskii, who wondered why Makhin had neither warned
him of his arrival nor chosen to visit him. Brianskii felt that Makhin’s mission had
“a political character”. He learnt from others that the colonel had told them that he
had established contact with officials in the Yugoslav government and was visiting
as a first step in a plan to extend Prague Zemgor’s work into Yugoslavia.66 Prague




66. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 139, Iugoslaviia 1923-1927, Letter, V. D. Brianskii to
Zemsko-Gorodskoi Komitet, n˚ 357, 10 March 1924.
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Zemgor denied this, saying that it had no concrete plans to expand into that country,
and that Makhin’s task was merely to see if graduates of Prague Zemgor’s tractor
courses could find work in Yugoslavia.67 
Whatever the truth, this was not the end of the matter. In August 1925, General
Wrangel complained that Makhin was once again in Yugoslavia. He claimed that
Makhin’s aim was to penetrate the ranks of military refugees under the cover of
Zemgor’s charitable work in order to carry out propaganda on behalf of the Party of
Socialist Revolutionaries. He therefore tasked his official representative in
Yugoslavia, Colonel V. I. Bazarevich, to protest to the War Ministry in order to
paralyse Makhin’s activity.68 Bazarevich later reported that he had succeeded in
persuading the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cancel a circular it had
issued giving support to Makhin.69 Nevertheless, Prague Zemgor did establish an
office in Yugoslavia, which it ran until 1928, after which the office continued as a
separate organisation under the control of Colonel Makhin. 
Makhin’s mission illustrates the political nature of aid. It is quite possible that
Makhin had no political agenda, and his concerns were purely humanitarian. But
simply by arriving in Belgrade, he trod on the toes of other aid organisations. In
addition, whatever Prague Zemgor’s actual motives, the plain fact that it was
dominated by members of left-wing parties meant that others were always going to
interpret its actions in a political light. Furthermore, the relative inability of Prague
Zemgor to penetrate Yugoslavia reflected the different political situation in that
country compared with Czechoslovakia. While the Czech government favoured
left-leaning organisations like Zemgor, the more conservative Yugoslav
government remained largely loyal to the Russian Army. Which organisations
dominated the aid effort in which countries depended in large part on the political
orientation of the countries in question.
Conclusion
It is clear from this history that it was impossible to isolate the business of
humanitarian aid from the severe political divisions which beset the inter-war
Russian emigration. It is tempting to imagine that some way could have been found
to unite the efforts of all organisations to use the few resources available to the
emigration in a more efficient manner. Looking at the conflicts between the Army
High Command and social organisations in Constantinople, one study concluded
that these had reduced the effectiveness of material help to the refugees.70 The
struggles for power brought “significant harm” to the already hard position of
67. Zemgor Archive, Arkhiv n˚ 139, Iugoslaviia 1923-1927, Letter to Brianskii, 25 March
1924.
68. HIA, WA, Box 146, File 31: 557, Letter, Wrangel to Kondzerovskii, 6 August 1925.
69. HIA, WA, Box 146, File 31: 560, Letter, Bazarevich to Kussonskii, 18 August 1925.
70.  Ippolitov et al., “Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Konstantinopole…” (art. cit. note 15): 84.
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refugees.71 This is possibly an exaggeration, since the resources available to the
emigration were too limited for very much more to have been done than was
actually done. Nevertheless, the conflicts which surrounded the aid question can
not have helped the delivery of support to those most in need. Unity could only
have made things better.
In practice, though, it is hard to see how this could have been achieved. Politics
could not have been avoided. Zemgor’s belief that it was apolitical does not hold up
to close scrutiny, since the simple fact of accepting the role of prime aid coordinator
was a political act, denying Wrangel’s claims to leadership and the army’s claim to
priority in the distribution of resources. As soon as Zemgor accepted the role the
Ambassadors offered it, it could not avoid conflict with the Army. On the other
hand, to have accepted Wrangel’s leadership would also have been a political
statement. The history of the conflict between Zemgor and the Army proves that the
provision of aid cannot be divorced from politics, and that those involved in it are as
much political actors as they are social ones. 
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